However, it is possible that an assigned counsel’s delay could be charged to the state if a breakdown in a state’s public defender system caused the delay. Ordinarily, “delays caused by defense counsel are properly attributed to the defendant, even where counsel is assigned” because “assigned counsel generally are not state actors for purposes of a speedy-trial claim.” Vermont v Brillon, 556 US 81, 92, 94 (2009). “The reasons for delay are examined by and each period of delay is assigned to either the prosecutor or the defendant.” People v Ross (Edward), 145 Mich App 483, 491 (1985). Regarding the second prong-reasons for delay-the court balances the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant. Where the delay following a defendant’s arrest is less than 18 months, the defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice by reason of the delay. For a delay of 18 months or more, prejudice to the defendant is presumed and the burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut the presumption. Where there has been a delay of at least six months after a defendant’s arrest, further investigation into a claim of denial of the right to a speedy trial is necessary. “Although not determinative of a speedy trial claim, length of delay is a factor that triggers an investigation of the speedy trial issue.” People v Hammond, 84 Mich App 60, 67 (1978). When a defendant claims a violation of the right to a speedy trial, the trial court must consider four factors: (1) the length of delay (2) the reasons for the delay (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right and (4) any prejudice to the defendant. In deciding whether a defendant has been afforded a speedy trial, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the four-part balancing established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514 (1972). To preserve the issue of speedy trial for appeal, a defendant must make a formal demand for a speedy trial on the record. “Whenever the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated, the defendant is entitled to dismissal of the charge with prejudice.” MCR 6.004(A). 1 “‘The time for judging whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated runs from the date of the defendant’s arrest.’” People v Patton, 285 Mich App 229, 236 (2009), quoting People v Williams (Cleveland), 475 Mich 245, 261 (2006). “The defendant and the people are entitled to a speedy trial and to a speedy resolution of all matters before the court.” MCR 6.004(A). ( Id.The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to criminal defendants by the federal and Michigan Constitutions, as well as by statute. ( See Thomas, 59 Misc 3d at 66.) Further, the People could have mitigated any undue delay by requesting that the matter be advanced for the dismissal of counts, and no record is before this court about whether the People made any attempts to do so. For example, under CPL 180.40 or 180.50, the People may submit an ex parte application to dismiss or reduce counts. The People had also several available remedies to declare their readiness without needing to cause any undue delay for M.V. The court did not even set a motion schedule, as the matter did not require any deliberation whatsoever. ( See Collins, 82 NY2d at 181 Thomas, 59 Misc 3d at 66.) In fact, upon review, the motion to dismiss the felony counts in this matter is only ministerial for the matter to be adjudicated in Criminal Court.
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